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Optimizely Web Experimentation: malicious code injected into customer Project JavaScript through a signup-flow flaw

Identifiers: Optimizely-Web-Experimentation-November-2026-incident

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Summary

On 16 November 2026, attacker-written code appeared in the Project JavaScript of some Optimizely Web Experimentation customer projects. Each affected snippet still loaded from Optimizely's CDN or a customer's own self-hosted path, so the code reached visitors through the snippet itself. Optimizely's status page update of 18 November 2026, 14:49 UTC, says an unauthorized third party exploited a flaw in the Web Experimentation account signup flow, used it to impersonate users on targeted customer accounts, and inserted malicious JavaScript into those customers' projects. Optimizely says it detected the activity on the day it began, blocked delivery of the malicious code, closed the vulnerability within three hours of detection, and removed the injected code from all affected projects. It states this was not a credentials breach, that the incident was limited to Web Experimentation, that fewer than 5% of its customers were impacted, and that it has contacted every Web Experimentation customer directly to confirm whether they were affected and to provide additional guidance. As of 19 November the incident is still listed as monitoring, not resolved.

Classification reason: Exploitation is reported by both Optimizely and Report URI. In its 18 November update the vendor says the vulnerability is closed, the injected code is removed from all affected projects, remediation is complete and every Web Experimentation customer has been contacted, but the status page still shows monitoring, not resolved. There is no version or patch for customers to install because the fix sits on Optimizely's side. Priority stays at attention because customers still need to confirm their own status and review any exposure that occurred while a modified snippet was served.

Impact

Report URI (Scott Helme) describes a loader that fetched a payload from an attacker domain. The payload reportedly swapped cryptocurrency addresses on pages and in the clipboard, skimmed card details typed into a site's own form fields, sent cookies readable by page scripts and page screenshots to the attacker, and on iPhones and iPads attempted to load exploit chains against older iOS versions. Card fields inside cross-origin hosted payment iframes and the values of HttpOnly cookies cannot be read by script running in the page, so this payload could not collect them. That is a limit of this payload, not a general guarantee that other payment flows were safe. Optimizely's three-hour figure counts from detection, not from when the modified code first reached visitors, and its under-5% figure counts customers, not visitors or victims. How many visitors, cards, cookies or devices were actually affected is not established in the public sources reviewed here. The researcher's figures cover only the snippets it could check in time. A clean snippet today does not undo exposure that happened while a modified snippet was being served.

Who is affected

Optimizely says it has contacted every Web Experimentation customer directly with their status and guidance, and that customers who do not use Web Experimentation need do nothing. If your site loads a Web Experimentation snippet, from cdn.optimizely.com or a self-hosted copy, make sure that message reached whoever owns your Optimizely account, and confirm the result yourself rather than relying on the vendor statement alone. If Optimizely confirms your project was modified, or you find modified code in it, your visitors were exposed during the interval that modified snippet was served, and the exposure steps below apply. Fewer than 5% of customers were affected according to Optimizely, so check your own project rather than assuming either way.

Products and versions

Products and versionsAffectedFixed
Optimizely Web Experimentation Customer projects whose Project JavaScript or experiment code was maliciously modified; affected project list and exact exposure interval require vendor confirmation Vendor reports signup-flow flaw closed, injected code removed and customers contacted; no customer-installable fixed version stated; incident remains monitoring

Exploitation evidence

Exploitation reported. Report URI reports finding the injected code in a sample of customer snippets it could check on 16 November, with the code cleaned from almost all of them by late that evening. Its update of 17 November 09:17 UTC says every infected snippet it observed had been clean since 23:11 UTC on 16 November, and that the attacker's main domains were being taken down. That post was unchanged when rechecked on 19 November. Optimizely's update of 18 November 14:49 UTC says the attacker exploited a flaw in the account signup flow to impersonate users on targeted customer accounts, that delivery of the malicious code was blocked and the vulnerability closed within three hours of detection on 16 November, and that no malicious code remains in its systems. These are the vendor's and researcher's statements about what they observed, not a general all-clear for individual sites. On-chain payments arrived at the attacker's wallets, but the researcher cannot tie them to particular sites or victims, and the actual number of visitors, cards, cookies or devices affected is not established in the public sources reviewed here.

Sources: Optimizely, Report URI / Scott Helme

Actions

  1. Locate Optimizely's direct notification to your account, confirm whether your project was listed as affected, and follow the additional guidance it provided. If no one on your team can find it, ask Optimizely for your status.
  2. In your Optimizely dashboard, open each project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code. Look for scripts you did not write, including anything decoded with atob(), and check the project's change history to establish your own exposure interval.
  3. Review users, API tokens and integrations with write access to your Optimizely account and remove what is not needed. Optimizely says this was not a credentials breach, so rotate only credentials you have a specific reason to believe were exposed.
  4. If your project was modified and your own forms collect card numbers, treat cards entered during the exposure interval as potentially exposed, and work through it with your payment provider and incident response team.
  5. If your project was modified, treat session tokens or secrets stored in cookies readable by script during that interval as potentially exposed, and rotate them based on your incident response assessment.
  6. If your project was modified, decide with your team whether customers should be informed about what your site served, taking advice as appropriate.
  7. Review your Content Security Policy with reporting enabled and test compatibility before enforcing changes. Allowlisting cdn.optimizely.com alone would not have blocked a modified snippet served from that host.

Unknowns

  • The technical detail of the signup-flow flaw and how impersonating users led to write access on targeted, unrelated customer projects. Optimizely has named the flaw's location but not described it further.
  • The exact exposure interval for each affected project. Optimizely's three hours is measured from detection, and it has not said when the first modified code reached visitors.
  • How many cards, cookies or devices were actually affected. Researcher figures cover only snippets they could find in time, and on-chain payments cannot be tied to specific sites or visitors.
  • Whether Optimizely will publish a fuller root cause or move the incident from monitoring to resolved.

Sources

  • Optimizely · published · updated · retrieved https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z
  • Report URI / Scott Helme · retrieved https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/
  • StepSecurity / Owais Shaikh · retrieved https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer
  • Optimizely · published · updated · retrieved https://status.optimizely.com/api/v2/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z.json

Change history

  1. — Published: Checked 18 Nov 2026. Injection observed by Report URI on 16 Nov. Optimizely status notice created 17 Nov 01:02 UTC reports vulnerability fixed, injected code removed and affected accounts secured, with status monitoring and no later update. Report URI update of 17 Nov 09:17 UTC reports observed snippets clean since 16 Nov 23:11 UTC and attacker domains being taken down. No project list or root cause published.
  2. — Updated: Updated 19 Nov 2026 for an incident first observed 16 Nov 2026. Optimizely status update of 18 Nov 14:49 UTC attributes access to a flaw in the Web Experimentation account signup flow used to impersonate users on targeted customer accounts. Vendor says activity was detected on 16 Nov, the vulnerability was closed within three hours of detection, injected code was removed from all affected projects, this was not a credentials breach, fewer than 5% of customers were impacted, no other product was affected, and every Web Experimentation customer has been contacted directly with status and guidance. Incident still shows monitoring. Report URI post rechecked unchanged. Removed the unknowns on entry method and missing customer guidance; technical detail of the flaw, per-project exposure interval and visitor outcomes remain unknown. Priority stays at attention for review of past exposure.

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